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ABSTRACT 
At a time when professional art criticism is on the wane, the ancient quarrel between art and 
philosophy demands fresh answers. Professional art criticism provided a basis upon which to 
distinguish apt experiences of art from the idiosyncratic. However, currently the kind of 
narratives from which critics once drew are underplayed or discarded in contemporary 
exhibition design where the visual arts are concerned. This leaves open the possibility that art 
operates either as mere stimulant to private reverie or, in the more contentful cases, as 
propaganda. The ancient quarrel between art and philosophy is that art influences 
surreptitiously while philosophy presents reasons that invite rational scrutiny. As such, in 
contrast to philosophy, art would undermine our agency. In July 2017, a group of 
philosophers gathered at the Art Gallery of NSW (AGNSW), in Sydney, Australia, in the 
presence of two AGNSW curators to explore the basis of their own experiences of selected 
artworks. Here, those commentaries are reproduced. Each reveal that objective grounds for an 
experience of art can be based in the community from which one draws one’s terms of 
reference. In our commentaries we see the expertise of the respective philosophical 
communities but other communities of culture or expertise might serve the same purpose and 
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hence resolve the ancient quarrel. Before hearing these commentaries, I explain what is at 
stake when the ancient quarrel between art and philosophy is understood in contemporary 
terms. This Issue of the Curator also includes an article on the community-based art criticism 
that emerges from these commentaries followed by an exhibition review which reveals the 
incorrigible impulse (also demonstrated in the commentaries) to find the basis for the most 
apt experience of an artwork. A response by the AGNSW curators completes this issue. 
 
 
Figure 1. Speakers and audience assemble for the Philosophical Intervention Symposium at the AGNSW on 
July 15, 2017 in front of Ai Weiwei, Forever 2003. © Ai Weiwei. Photo: © artsense.edu.au [Color figure can be 
viewed at http://artsense.edu.au/workshop-2017-photos/] 
 
WHATEVER HAPPENED TO ART CRITICISM? 
This discussion is limited to those institutions like the Art Gallery of N.S.W (AGNSW) 
which collect and preserve examples of visual art from various traditions with an emphasis on 
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understanding the visual-art-heritage of their citizens. European, Australian Indigenous, 
Asian and Middle Eastern, African and American traditions are all relevant to understanding 
Australian visual-art. It is important to note that this enquiry is not about visual culture 
generally but the narrower focus of visual art which is the purview of institutions like the 
AGNSW.  
Artworks take their place within a world of images. The twenty-first century has seen 
the artworld dissolve into a plethora of practices, where the art- gallery-museum takes its 
place as one of many public spaces which occasion experiences of entertainment, reflection, 
and communication about a range of topical issues (see Hein 2007: 79-81). A gallery visitor 
once might have felt it incumbent upon them to read about the art historical context of a work 
and the art critic’s view of its meaning and significance to the artworld. However, today art is 
often understood as a statement on a topical issue, while many visitors simply immerse 
themselves in images, videos or environments which strike them as evocative, not unlike the 
way they engage with music videos or the visual spectacle offered by a rock concert. The 
concepts through which an art-gallery visitor understands their experience might be drawn 
from popular culture rather than confined to professional art commentary (McMahon and 
Gilchrist 2017; and see Said 2005: 58-59). 
For example, many media outlets have dropped the art critic’s regular commentary. It 
has been suggested that this is because art critiques are relevant to only those who live in the 
vicinity of the relevant exhibition while online media outlets aim to capture much larger 
audiences.1 However, for the traditional art exhibition viewer, the art critique served as more 
than advertisement. The possibility of meaning-making requires a critical as well as receptive 
interface, and the art critic created this kind of context. The critic would defend an 
interpretation and a judgment with clear reasons in the form of metaphors, analogies and 
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prior examples; and when effective, the viewer could then approach the work with the 
configurations and construals with which the critic had equipped them. 
Some of the reasons for the demise of the art critic might also include a concern for 
diversity, multi-perspectives and inclusion. One would not want to exclude those not 
interested in art historical classifications and artworld theories from engaging with visual art. 
But when there is nothing to get wrong, there is nothing to get right either. There is scope for 
treating visual art as visual journalism but this does not speak to the way visual art can reflect 
ideas or norms emerging within the zeitgeist of our times. The artist often feels their way and 
it would take the art critic to articulate what was emerging in their work. This is what 
distinguished their work from propaganda. One had to be party to what one understood by the 
work. This crucial aspect of the artworld is traditionally what attracted many art gallery 
visitors.  
Richard Rorty discussed an issue in literary criticism along similar lines (Curthoys 
2014). Literary criticism was seen by Rorty as an opportunity to draw the lines of ethical 
norms in new places and configure the shape of hope in new images. That is, it was not about 
the retrieval of what this or that author had in mind, but rather what was constructed by a 
community of readers at a particular time in history. Rorty argued that the progress of 
morality has had more to do with sentimentality, and opportunities to find objects worthy of 
our sentiments, than anything delivered up by clear analytic reasoned discourse, and that 
literature played a role in providing such opportunities.2 Could we ascribe this role to visual 
art also? 
The trouble with this view of things though is that sentiments can be dumb and fickle; 
and manipulating sentiment can be dangerous compared to persuading with reasoned 
argument. Aristotle recommended the politician or orator use rhetoric on a general audience 
because they would not be persuaded by reason alone. But rhetoric is manipulative. Unless 
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reason is brought to bear upon such persuasive meaning-making, people can be persuaded to 
beliefs that in more reasoned and less sentimental contexts they would reject. What does this 
mean for the diverse multi-voice all-inclusive engagement art-museums-galleries now foster? 
However, diversity is not necessarily a case of relativism as Paul Guyer’s aesthetic 
pluralism reveals in his commentary to follow. And as we will see in David Macarthur, 
Michael Newall and Mohan Matthen’s commentaries, art can be experienced in a way which 
is grounded in objective terms of reference other than art historical classifications and art 
theoretical knowledge. All the authors of the commentaries that follow, even those who do 
base their experiences at least in part on the art critic’s traditional concerns, such as Cynthia 
Freeland and Robert Sinnerbrink, explain the touchstone for their experience in their 
philosophical preoccupations. And the traditions and debates that ground these 
preoccupations constitute the philosophical communities from which they draw their terms of 
reference. While the communities of art historians and critics have less influence in the way 
art-gallery-museums attempt to engage their visitors, other communities have taken their 
place. So as we hope to demonstrate through the following commentaries, while the 
communicative capacity of art has arguably splintered according to the community in which 
one derives the concepts that shape one’s experience (McDowell 1996), this does not 
necessarily suggest that art acts upon us as rhetoric. Professional art criticism may have been 
overtaken by contemporary conditions such as social media and cultural diversity, but 
community-based practices may have filled the gap. 
 
THE ANCIENT QUARREL: ARISTOTLE AND KANT ON RHETORIC 
Before proceeding to the commentaries, it is worth examining how the practices associated 
with what we now consider the creative arts could have so threatened some in the ancient 
world, to see whether the conditions today are any different. Aristotle thought that art could 
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actually be exploited to achieve one’s goals. According to Aristotle, the substance of 
rhetorical persuasion works mainly by arousing prejudice, pity, anger and similar emotions. 
The modes of persuasion adopted by a rhetorician depend upon her personal character and a 
consideration of who her audience is, because she would need to put her audience into a 
certain frame of mind in order to effect change in their attitudes. By rhetoric, the audience is 
made to feel that the very proof of the position promoted is the rhetoric itself. In this sense, 
art has been thought of as an example of rhetoric. Aristotle thought that to uncover what the 
audience sees as in their interest is to uncover the persuasive facts and this is what the 
rhetorician exploits one way or another.  
If art exploits rhetoric, then the artist is something of a politician. We might think, like 
Immanuel Kant, that this is too narrow an understanding of what art can be. Kant 
distinguished between poetry and the best speeches of skilled orators. Beautiful speeches, he 
thought, used rhetoric which involved moving people “like machines” by “using the 
weakness of people for one’s own purposes (however well intentioned …)” to reach a 
judgment that in “calm reflection” might “lose all weight for them”.3 Poetry, on the other 
hand, according to Kant, afforded pure enjoyment. So poetry, like beautiful speeches, evoked 
an experience of beauty, but whereas the beauty of the speech exploits one’s desires in order 
to influence, the beauty of poetry simply inspired reflection. 
Nonetheless, if reflection is anything more than personal reverie or daydreaming, that 
is, if we are going to claim that the reflection inspired by art increases understanding, and this 
is surely what those who would claim a serious cultural role for art would accept, then the 
onus is on us to explain how art can achieve this by means other than rhetoric. In other words, 
the ancient quarrel in the contemporary context still requires an answer. 
 
IMAGINING: INSIGHT OR DELUSION? 
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The meaning and significance we ascribe to any particular artwork is not easily conveyed; 
that is, if you hope to bring another person to perceive the same meaning in the work. You 
would need to understand the basis of the metaphors, analogies or prior examples called upon 
by your interlocutor. Let’s call the meaning and significance of an artwork its particular 
“insight” to distinguish it from literal messages. 
If we gain insight from art, our insight is based on impressions and images created by 
an artist whose relation to fact is stipulated by herself, hence a kind of fiction. This is where 
the connection with imagining is typically made. As such, the characteristic engagement with 
art is a form of imagining. 
The association of imagining with art is where the ancient quarrel with philosophy 
gains traction. Unless art is mere entertainment and diversion, it must be a source of 
knowledge, or insight: at its most effecting, it can be a new way of understanding, 
experiencing or feeling. But if insight is based on a state of imagining prompted by art, then 
in effect we are claiming that we gain insight from imagining. But the artist invents and 
creates rather than discovers. And to recognize what the artwork means we must recognize 
something we already knew. So belief formed on the basis of art is either delusional (on 
imagining) or trivial (you already knew it). A closer look at the nature of imagining not only 
resolves this issue, but also supports a role for diverse communities in grounding the meaning 
ascribed to art. First I consider the constraints on imagining before returning to the role of 
diverse communities, as demonstrated in our commentaries, for a robust visual art culture 
within art galleries-museums. 
 
The Plausibility Constraint on Imagining 
When used instructively such as in problem-solving, imagination results in learning about the 
world. In this mode, imagination is anchored in reality and is under certain constraints (Kind 
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and Kung 2016). But bear in mind that when imagining is used in problem solving, new facts 
are never acquired on the basis of that imagining alone.  
In scientific and legal reasoning, for example, belief is never based on an hypothesis 
(which is where imagining comes in) but rather the results of the experiment or research that 
is guided by the hypothesis. In contrast, imagining prompted by art does not involve forming 
hypotheses which are subsequently tested. We do not delay our experience of insight until we 
get the opportunity to test the hypothesis. Instead, the quality of the imagining prompts 
further reflection which prompts further imagining. Insight emerges from this process if at 
all. 
It is often supposed that imagining can “fly completely free of reality” such as when 
engaged in day dreaming and fantasy; and as art does not fit into an explicit problem-solving 
mode, it is commonly associated with this unconstrained flying-free-of-reality type of 
imaginative engagement (Kind 2016).4 But if art were an occasion for this kind of 
unconstrained imagining, then artistic insight would be ungrounded and delusional.  
But this claim can be mitigated somewhat when we consider the nature of imagining 
further. Art and its references must be plausible to engage imagining. So like hypothesizing, 
artistic imagining is constrained by actual world plausibility. But unlike hypothesizing, the 
fact that the imaginings are plausible is itself the spark to reflection in art, and one’s 
reflection fuels further imagining. 
That is, we cannot separate the artistic world entirely from the actual world in the 
processes which constitute imagining (cf., Walton 1990, 274). This is nicely borne out by the 
commentaries to follow. Imagining in engaging with art involves a continual interaction with 
real world constraints. The reflection prompted by art when it is ultimately experienced as 
insightful, is part of the relevant imagining: it enriches and motivates it. 
9 
 
This is perhaps most obvious where emotions and feelings are concerned. For 
example, when we are required to link feelings and objects in entirely new ways, such as 
finding something funny or surprising that would not be funny or surprising in the actual 
world, our subjectivity becomes disengaged and imagining stops. We could apply this to 
values and morality also in the same way. We disengage when expected to adopt values we 
do not hold.5 This is an example of the plausibility constraint on imagining. There might be 
implausible things which we are meant to entertain but even in comic book scenarios and 
Science Fiction, unless our subjectivities are hooked into possible scenarios, reflect goals or 
intentions which we find coherent and plausible, our attention will flag. 
But while this addresses the problem of delusion, the problem it raises is that it would 
seem impossible to actually learn anything new from art. Consider that the main outlines of 
imagining are stipulated by the artwork’s imagery, but it is the actual world inferences that 
are generated by us that hook our subjectivity into reflecting upon it. It is only when 
imaginings are felt to be significantly interwoven through with our actual world reflections 
that a work is experienced as insightful. Given that plausibility is based on our experience, 
knowledge and training, we would simply become disengaged if art genuinely threw up 
something new because, based on our experience, knowledge and training, it would just seem 
implausible. So what could insight be if not a case of learning something new? 
 
The Ascription of Meaning and Significance 
The commentaries suggest that while it is true that what we already know constrains our 
reception to art, the meaning and significance of what we thought we knew can be changed 
by an artwork. Research analysed by the philosopher Tamar Szabó Gendler provides a way of 
understanding this point. 
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Gendler reports on research that shows that a process known as priming in the 
psychological literature alters the configuration of sets of beliefs. For example, priming can 
change what is foregrounded and backgrounded in our belief system (2006a and 2006b).6 
While it does not involve the acquisition of new beliefs, it does influence the way memory 
items are associated. For example, once a range of events and images are experienced as 
associated together, subsequently if one of the items is triggered, the whole set comes to mind 
including the values and connotations attached to them. Such sets of associations or beliefs 
are called schemata in psychology. The way beliefs are related within schemata influences 
behaviour: an environmental trigger can determine what we notice, select, prioritize in our 
surroundings and in some cases, our subsequent social interactions. The contents of our 
schemata in large part are thought to constitute the meaning we ascribe to experience. 
Priming can also influence the threshold at which evidence is considered adequate for 
belief. So for example, if a person resembles a war-time enemy, even though the context has 
changed, it might take less evidence to convince you that the person who bears a resemblance 
to the enemy has perpetrated some crime. The upside of priming is a certain economy in the 
use of our cognitive resources; for example, we recognise a great deal about our environment 
just by such triggers without having to consciously note every detail. But of course the 
downside is that in some cases it constitutes prejudice. 
Significantly for us, Gendler reports that priming is source indifferent; that is, which 
beliefs come to be associated together within a particular schema can just as easily be brought 
together and subsequently stored in memory based on imagining as from perception of actual 
world events. Schemata are formed equally effectively whether their source is perception or 
imagining. But imagining has to involve our subjectivity, our feelings, in order to impact 
upon our schemata in this way, and as we have seen, this will be constrained by plausibility. 
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Nonetheless, the source indifference of priming suggests that art can contribute to the 
way beliefs are linked, how they are prioritized, and consequently, the psychological salience 
they subsequently hold for us. 
This research helps us to understand how art can have an impact on our understanding 
without providing us with new beliefs. However, it raises again the problem with which we 
started. When art is found insightful it is because it has impacted upon our attitudes, and in 
turn will have some impact on our goals, intentions, or behavior. This suggests that we allow 
the artist an authority which is the very thing Plato objected to when he banned artists from 
the Ideal Republic. 
 
INSIGHT VERSES RHETORIC: RESOLVING THE ANCIENT QUARREL 
I have argued above that art can cause us to feel, notice or attend to things in the actual world 
in new ways. This leads to the problem of rhetoric and manipulation. Unless the content of 
this “insight” can be noted, critiqued and revised, then artistic insight would operate on us 
just like the rhetoric that Aristotle thought politicians must learn to master and that Kant 
thought made us respond “like machines”. This would suggest that art deploys the same 
processes exploited by advertising or propaganda (and hence explains why Plato banned art).  
Attempting to translate a work into explicit reasons trivialises it (Stolnitz 1992; cf. 
Rowe 2009 and Hurley 2009) because imagining eludes such attempts.  However, on the one 
hand, what one is able to perceive as the meaning of a work depends on one’s experience, 
knowledge and training and on the other, whether one is inclined to perceive meaning in a 
work depends on the artwork itself providing the occasion to engage one in imagining that is 
not only plausible but also related in effective ways to one’s own goals and interests. As such, 
art can prompt the kind of imagining that engages reasons. The philosopher Peter Langland-
Hassan identifies three features that characterise the cognitive architecture of imaginings 
12 
 
(2016, 63) which can usefully be applied to this question. First he observes that there is initial 
involvement of top-down intentions which in the case of imagining prompted by art, would 
involve stipulations made by the artist. And these prompt automatic inferences generated by 
us. Second, as imagining proceeds there are certain lateral constraints on what can be 
imagined. This means that the automatic inferences generated by us are based on our 
experience, knowledge and training. Thirdly, there is cyclical involvement of top-down 
intentions throughout the course of an imagining which involves the impact of our goals and 
interests on how we focus, what we emphasize and dwell upon and in turn, this influences the 
subsequent imagining. As you can see, such a structure allows a considerable variation 
between audience members in how they engage with any particular work. 
We can now see that it is the impact of our intentions on imagining that is crucial in 
distinguishing artistic insight from the effects of rhetoric; because it involves a critical 
reflection on the implications of the images and metaphors we engage with. Again, this is 
very aptly drawn out and demonstrated by the commentaries in this issue. Contemporary art 
in particular, shows the kind of investment required of us in order to engage with it as can be 
seen in Macarthur’s commentary on Thomas Demand’s “Modell/Model” (2000) and 
Sinnerbrink on Weiwei’s “Forever” (2003). 
A key feature of artistic insight which is demonstrated by the following commentaries 
is that we recognise and endorse an attitude toward a theme in the work when it resonates 
with our actual world concerns. We acquire images from an artwork, but their significance is 
represented, uncovered or constructed by us, and those images can stay with us, in terms of 
the way they orientate us to relevant aspects of the world.7 So the solution to the ancient 
quarrel between art and philosophy as it manifests in contemporary terms, involves 
recognizing that the imagining prompted by art operates under the constraints of experience 
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and plausibility. When it is found memorable and impactful, it is because we gain 
understanding relative to our goals and interests.  
An implication of this response to the distinction between art and rhetoric is that the 
significance of any particular work cannot be fixed across diverse communities. An artistic 
trope for one group might be the expression of a cultural bias for another. Furthermore, we 
construct mental images not only in response to explicit images or suggestions, but in 
response to ellipses in the imagery. The images we carry away from an artwork might signify 
possibilities the details of which depend on our emotional and cognitive resources. Affective 
force, plausibility and reflection are all involved, but whether and how they manifest depends 
on the resources of the audience. 
 
DIVERSE COMMUNITIES 
The range of possible meaning-ascriptions is not necessarily a recipe for relativism. The 
meanings ascribed to works might be relative to particular communities but within those 
communities, even the process involved in attempting to make one’s responses understood by 
one’s peers involves the calibration of terms of reference and in turn the gradual alignment of 
the values associated with them. There may not be just one community with its one over-
arching hierarchy of terms of reference, as was once set by art critics, art historians and 
curators, but rather a range of communities with their own sets of terms of reference (cf. Hein 
1993).8 In the commentaries which follow, the responses demonstrate the degree to which 
when art is experienced, it is experienced in virtue of the community from which one has 
developed one’s interests, and from which one has adopted one’s terms of reference. In our 
case, the various communities of philosophers that have formed around particular themes or 
debates create the conditions by which our philosophers can communicate their responses. 
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If art can be insightful then there is something in the work; and the audience seeks to 
interpret it. This may be compatible with a range of aspects and perspectives but 
interpretations can be disengaging unless one can find a solid basis for it in the work. Freud 
got that right when he argued that a person’s daydreams lose interest for anyone other than 
the daydreamer; but creative work (Freud was specifically referring to creative writing) finds 
an objective base to engage others (1908 [1959]). So when there are a variety of perspectives 
on a work we typically judge one to be more apt than another based on the reasons put 
forward. 
To engage in an episode of meaning-making that is something other than sentiment or 
rhetoric, is to enter the space of reasons. Reasons are vulnerable to disagreement and it is this 
aspect that occasions learning from another’s perspective.  Philosophers throughout history 
have noted the value of disagreement, and the giving and asking for reasons that 
disagreement prompts, to the advance of culture.  
 
THE COMMENTARIES 
There are six commentaries, an essay and an exhibition review to follow. The commentaries 
adopt a range of approaches. We see the convergence of the three classic approaches to 
aesthetics in Paul Guyer’s commentary on Paul Cezanne’s “Banks of the Marne” (circa 
1888): artistic intentionalism, phenomenology and formalism. Guyer effectively challenges 
the assumption that these three approaches are mutually exclusive. His response to Cezanne 
can be seen to originate in his expertise on the history of philosophy. Cynthia Freeland adapts 
these aspects in her response to Clarice Beckett’s painting “Evening, St. Kilda Road” (circa 
1930) to focus on feelings or moods. She identifies the feelings or moods in her experience of 
the work but questions whose feelings and moods they are: the artist’s, her own, or a property 
of the work.  Freeland’s concerns emanate from her cognitive theory of art, a position shared 
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with those philosophers who draw upon cognitive science to understand both the content and 
reception of art. While both Guyer and Freeland experience their chosen paintings in terms of 
philosophical theories of art, David Macarthur shifts gear to philosophise not about art but 
with art. 
Macarthur perceives the Thomas Demand photographic work entitled “Modell/Model” 
(2000) as a critical analysis of “seeing-is-believing”. He places Demand in the tradition of 
Socrates, showing us how Demand brings us to see that perception can be misleading. Robert 
Sinnerbrink enters his critique from another direction. Through a consideration of Weiwei’s 
“Forever” (2003) he considers whether there can be a productive worthwhile relation between 
philosophy and art. He might be seen to consider whether philosophy’s distrust of art, 
because of its perceived proximity to rhetoric, is shown to be misplaced by the extent to 
which Weiwei’s practice inspires us to engage cultural and political contexts in order to 
understand his work. 
Plato once railed against giving the artist the authority to lead us. This is because Plato 
argued in The Republic that artists influence our attitudes through rhetoric. However, 
contemporary art draws to our attention the degree to which we need to be party to the 
meaning of the work: we construct the meaning or ascribe it in reception. And this 
Sinnerbrink demonstrates in his commentary. 
Michael Newall and Mohan Matthen in their commentaries exchange views on the 
nature of pictorial realism. Newall describes how he experiences the objects in a painting by 
Tom Roberts “Holiday Sketch at Coogee” (1888) as the objects they depict. Matthen analyses 
how perception of Roberts’ painting involves unconsciously learnt visual cues in which 
selection and prioritization play a part. Newall’s commentary emanates from a long 
involvement in philosophical debates regarding how pictures represent, while expertise on 
philosophy of perception characterises Matthen’s commentary. 
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The commentaries reveal the concerns not of individuals but of the communities whose 
traditions of reasoned debate and analysis provide the means by which these philosophers 
experience the works. 
This brings us to Joseph Kassman-Todd’s philosophical essay which uncovers the 
philosophical assumptions about art criticism which underpin this issue. I argued earlier that 
art criticism is overtaken by various current practices but Kassman-Todd’s conception of art 
criticism incorporates many of those practices. He shows that genuine attempts to engage 
with an artwork will always involve an objective basis but this basis might just be the 
community which conditions one’s response to a work. 
Finally this part of the Issue is rounded off by an exhibition review by Ian McLean. 
McLean discusses a permanent exhibition at the AGNSW, “Pukumani Grave Posts” (circa 
1958) created by a group of Indigenous artists lead by Laurie Nelson Mungatopi. This is an 
installation of seventeen “funerary” poles. McLean critiques the category mistake 
demonstrated by exhibiting this work as part of the narrative of Western art. This challenge 
nicely demonstrates a core theme of this issue, and one which in effect we have argued 
dissolves the ancient quarrel. This is the natural impulse to find reasons to judge one 
meaning-ascription more apt than another; and in turn, the possibility of distinguishing 
between the kind of experiences had (Hein 2011: 183). Without this impulse, there would be 
no category mistake and nothing to prevent art from dissolving into mere rhetoric. 
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NOTES 
1. Ben Davis (2018) argues that the audience for art criticism is small because it is seen 
as a recommendation to attend an exhibition so only of local interest. The dominance 
of global media has overtaken professional art criticism and replaced it, according to 
Davis, with art celebrity or institutional scandal. See also Elkins (2003, 56-77) on the 
demise of professional art criticism.  
2. For a discussion of Rorty on literary criticism, a brief overview is provided by Ned 
Curthoys (2014). 
3. On Kant’s distinction between poetry and rhetoric see: AK 5: 327, 328 fn, § 53. “AK” 
refers to the Akademie Edition (the Prussian Academy edition) of Kant’s complete 
works. AK 5 refers to volume 5 which includes Kant’s Critique of the Power of 
Judgment. 
4. This is the way imagining in fiction is understood in Amy Kind (2016), 158. See also 
Amy Kind and Peter Kung (2016): 1, 13, 15-16, 23. They argue that imagination is 
either treated as instructive or alternatively transcendental (flying free from reality). In 
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